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Bad Apples, Bad Barrels and Bad Barrel-Makers - Why Evil Exists
Donna L. Roberts, PhD

“The line between good and evil lies at the center of every human heart. It is not an abstraction
out there. It’s a decision you have to make every day inside.”
- Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, Russian poet imprisoned under Stalin
“You can’t be a sweet cucumber in a vinegar barrel.”
- Phil Zimbardo, social psychologist

After his iconic, and controversial, Stanford Prison Experiment, Phil Zimbardo spent a career
trying to understand the nature of evil, and particularly the influences on individuals to perform
evil acts. He resisted the individualistic notion that evil was perpetrated solely by inherently bad
people and strove to answer the age-old question of why “good people” do “bad things.” He
concluded with a three-part schema of influences that spanned from the micro to the macro from the individual to the larger institutions in society. He referred to these causes of evil as
“bad apples, bad barrels and bad barrel-makers.”

Bad Apples
This is the straight-forward, linear cause-and-effect logic we’re used to. A bad person does bad
things. And there’s certainly some truth to it. One does not have to ponder long before
examples aplenty come to mind to prove its efficacy. Adolf Hitler. Charles Manson. Ted Bundy.
But rarely are people - bad people - so one dimensional or extreme. As Zimbardo says,
We imagine a line between good and evil, and we like to believe that it’s
impermeable. We are good on this side. The bad guys, the bad women,
they are on that side, and the bad people never will become good, and the
good never will become bad. I’ll say today that’s nonsense. Because that
line is … permeable. Because sometimes, just like human cells, material
flows in and out. And if it does, then it could allow some ordinary people
like you to become perpetrators of evil (Wargo, 2006).

Bad Barrels
Think about it for a moment. Are you a bad person? I’m guessing most people reading this
would answer that “No.” But have you ever done anything “bad?” This time, I’m guessing that
most would answer that one “Yes.” What is the nature of the disconnect? What happened to
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make “good” you do a “bad” thing? I’m sure there are reasons, and some of them valid ones youth, illness, stress, ignorance, peer pressure, a moment of temporary insanity, etc.
Reasons are explanations, not excuses, so perhaps in hindsight your take-away from this bad
thing you did was enlightenment and a vow not to repeat the behavior. Whatever the specifics
of the reason, some set of conditions encouraged you to act a certain way that was atypical.
This is the essence of the lesson from the Stanford Prison Experiment - that circumstances can
influence your behavior even to the extent of facilitating you to do something you would not
ordinarily, under other circumstances, do.
We are all reactive individuals. We all respond to our environment. We can all be broken down.
We can all be influenced. The question becomes, where is our tipping point? Where is that
sweet spot (or perhaps more deftly termed, that sour spot) where we can be influenced to do
something out of character?
Even serial killer Ted Bundy, previously noted as an example of a bad apple, cited situational
factors that influenced his behavior. Ted Bundy killed more than thirty people and engaged in
sexual assault and necrophilia, evidence enough for most to consider him a bad apple. In his
final interview with psychologist James Dobson just hours before his execution in 1989, Bundy
described himself as just like everyone’s son or husband, insisting that he was negatively
influenced by pornography and violence in the media (Dobson, 1989).
It actually happens to us all, every day in small ways. Do you remember the first time you heard
about a school shooting? While not the first deadly school shooting, the 1999 Columbine
massacre (as it was to become labeled) was the first to unfold in real time over live television.
Remember how shocked and horrified you were? How you couldn’t believe such a thing could
happen in a safe place like a school? And then another happened . . . and then another.
Certainly, you still think it is a horrible thing, but you are not as shocked when you hear about
another incident. The unthinkable has become the possible. While not commonplace, it is no
longer uncommon. We have become desensitized, a process also referred to as psychic
numbing. It is a necessary part of our survival mechanism. As Darwin said, “It is not the
strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is
most adaptable to change.” We survive because we adapt to our environment. We change our
behavior because of our situation. And yet, certainly there are some things that we should not
become accustomed to – things that tolerating at that level changes our humanity.
Despite the various criticisms of the Stanford Prison study, it did show us - as did Milgram’s
Obedience experiment, and to a lesser, more mundane extent, Asch’s Conformity study - that
people (even overzealous professors) can be influenced to act badly under certain conditions.
Zimbardo coined the term “The Lucifer Effect” to explain that transformation. Were they
“bad”? In that context, yes. Were they bad apples? Probably not. Were they in a bad barrel?
Decidedly so.
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Bad Barrel Makers
Beyond the person and the situation, Zimbardo theorized another macro-level influence that
holds the power to facilitate bad, even heinous, behavior. He termed this influence the Bad
Barrel Makers, in keeping with the analogy of his construct. Zimbardo crystalized this concept
after serving as an expert witness for the defense at an Abu Ghraib court martial. Speaking
about the situation in that Iraqi prison, Zimbardo says,
When you put that set of horrendous work conditions and external factors
together, it creates an evil barrel. You could put virtually anybody in it and
you're going to get this kind of evil behavior. The Pentagon and the military
say that the Abu Ghraib scandal is the result of a few bad apples in an
otherwise good barrel. That's the dispositional analysis. The social
psychologist in me, and the consensus among many of my colleagues in
experimental social psychology, says that's the wrong analysis. It's not the
bad apples, it's the bad barrels that corrupt good people. Understanding
the abuses at this Iraqi prison starts with an analysis of both the situational
and systematic forces operating on those soldiers working the night shift in
that 'little shop of horrors' (Wargo, 2006).
Zimbardo was not the only one to cite his experiment as relevant to explaining the atrocities at
the prison in Iraq. The 2004 Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DOD Detention
Operations, chaired by former secretary of defense and director of the CIA, James Schlesinger,
included an entire appendix outlining the “conceptual parallels between the brutality that
erupted in the Stanford Prison Experiment and the gross human rights violations that occurred
at Abu Ghraib” (Harding, 2018, p. 131). Schlesinger further argued that the Stanford Prison
Experiment “provides a cautionary tale for all military detention operations” (O’Reilly, 2013, p.
291).
Specifically, the parallels focused on “the creation of a context and environment where abuse is
facilitated and where equivocal leadership subtly encouraged participants to adopt abusive and
sadistic behavior and led them to commit heinous acts they otherwise would not commit”
(Harding, 2018, p.131). Harding goes on to suggest that
What the would-be guards in the Stanford Prison Experiment ultimately had
in common with the real guards at sites like Abu Ghraib is that they
repeatedly played into expectations and were pulled in by the vacuum of an
unwritten but hardly ambiguous script – understanding full well what the
implicit directive was, not only tasking them with control and surveillance of
prisoners while neglecting to provide them with clear guidelines but also, in
the case of Abu Ghraib, placing them at a distant and remote site where
neither the public nor existing legal structures would counterbalance the
lack of clear guidelines with effective oversight” (p. 131)
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Zimbardo’s schema is fundamentally simple and enticingly intuitive. The discipline of social
psychology already embraces, or more accurately is truly founded upon, the power of groups
and their dynamics, including such concepts as group-think, mob/herd mentality, and diffusion
of responsibility. Almost anyone can recall an instance where they were influenced by a group
to do something they would not have done independently, and most concede, at least
intellectually, that oppressive regimes affect the mind and spirit of those oppressed. The
question then becomes, what do we do with this insight? How does it affect how and who we
hold accountable for an injustice or a heinous act?
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